The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism by John D. Norton
Philosophy of Science, 75 (December 2008) pp. 786–798. 0031-8248/2008/7505-0025$10.00
Copyright 2008 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
786
The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple
Failure of Determinism
John D. Norton†‡
Newton’s equations of motion tell us that a mass at rest at the apex of a dome with
the shape speciﬁed here can spontaneously move. It has been suggested that this in-
determinism should be discounted since it draws on an incomplete rendering of New-
tonian physics, or it is “unphysical,” or it employs illicit idealizations. I analyze and
reject each of these reasons.
1. Introduction. It has been widely recognized for over two decades that,
contrary to the long-standing lore, Newtonian mechanics is not a deter-
ministic theory. The clarion call came in John Earman’s (1986, Chapter
3), which recounted the failure of determinism, including the then-recent
discovery by Mather and McGehee of “space invader” systems of inter-
acting particles that spontaneously rush into an empty space from spatial
inﬁnity. Further, simpler violations of determinism emerged. Pe ´rez Larau-
dogoitia (1996) described an especially simple example of “supertask”
indeterminism in which a countable inﬁnity of masses conﬁned to a unit
interval are spontaneously energized; and Norton (1999) described a cor-
respondingly simple example of a countable inﬁnity of masses connected
by springs that are spontaneously energized.
In this developing tradition, the simplest example so far of indeter-
minism in Newtonian physics is what has come to be known as “the
dome,” described in Norton (2003, Section 3). The indeterminism involves
none of the complications of inﬁnitely many systems interacting or masses
appearing with unbounded speeds from spatial inﬁnity. A mass sits on a
dome in a gravitational ﬁeld. After remaining motionless for an arbitrary
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Figure 1. The dome.
time, it spontaneously moves in an arbitrary direction, with these inde-
terministic motions compatible with Newtonian mechanics.
This note will consider whether the dome depends on some improper
maneuver in Newtonian theory. I will argue that it does not. Resolving
this issue proves to be of unexpected philosophical interest. It requires a
careful appraisal of three questions: Just what is Newtonian theory? What
do we mean by the notion “unphysical”? Are someidealizationsimproper?
2. The Dome in Brief.
2.1. Description. The dome is a radially symmetric surface shown in
Figure 1. Its shape is deﬁned by
3/2 h p (2/3g)r , (1)
where r is the radial distance coordinate in the surface of the dome, h is
the vertical distance below the apex at , and g is the constant ac- r p 0
celeration of free unit mass in the vertical gravitational ﬁeld surrounding
the surface. A point-like, unit mass slides frictionlessly over the surface.
Initially, at time , it is at rest exactly at the apex. The net force F t p 0
acting on the unit mass is directed radially outward. It is the component
of the gravitational force tangent to the surface, which is , where v gsinv
is the angle between the tangent to the surface in the radial direction and
the horizontal. Since , we have . Newton’s
1/2 sinv p dh/dr F p gdh/dr p r
second law sets this force equal to the acceleration and
22 a(t) p dr /dt
yields the equation of motion of the mass:
2 2 1/2 dr /dt p r . (2)788 JOHN D. NORTON
The expected solution is
r(t) p 0, (3)
in which the mass simply remains at rest for all times t. Another family
of solutions represents spontaneous motion at an arbitrary time T in an
arbitrary radial direction:
4 (1/144)(t  T)f o r t ≥ T
r(t) p (4) {0f o r t ≤ T.
We see that (4) satisﬁes (2) if we compute the radial acceleration a(t) p
, which is
22 dr (t)/dt
2 (1/12)(t  T)f o r t ≥ T
a(t) p (5) {0f o r t ≤ T,
and note that as given in (5) is the square root of as given in (4). a(t) r(t)
The dome manifests indeterminism
1 in the standard sense that a single
past can be followed by many futures. The mass may be at rest for all
times up to . It then may or may not move spontaneously at any t p 0
time after that.
2
Elsewhere (Norton 2003, Section 3) I have responded to concerns about
the moment . Brieﬂy, since no net force acts on the mass at t p Tt p
, does Newton’s ﬁrst law obtain? It does, since (5) tells us the mass has T
zero acceleration at . Those who yearn for a ﬁrst cause to initiate t p T
the motion should recall that a requirement of a ﬁrst cause is not a part
of Newton’s laws of motion. Further, there is no ﬁrst moment of accel-
eration at which this ﬁrst cause might act. The moment is the last t p T
moment of unaccelerated motion.
2.2. Individual versus Collective Indeterminism. This manifestation of
indeterminism differs from those already in the literature. In the case of
supertask indeterminism, each component is well behaved. If a component
is set into motion, the reason is that it has been struck, pushed, or pulled
by another component. The space invader form of indeterminism is odder
in the sense that it involves components that pop into being “from spatial
1. Equation (2) with initial conditions fails to satisfy a familiar r(0) p dr(0)/dt p 0
condition sufﬁcient for existence and uniqueness of a solution, a Lipschitz condition.
I originally concocted the dome example by starting with a textbook example of a
violation of a Lipschitz condition and then worked backward to a plausible physical
instantiation.
2. I have used the fact that Newtonian theory assigns no probabilities to these different
outcomes as a way of illustrating my claim elsewhere that inductive inference need not
be probabilistic (see Norton 2007, Section 8.3).THE DOME 789
inﬁnity” with unbounded speeds. However, each individual component is
well behaved locally. If we look at the motion of any component in some
part of spacetime of ﬁnite spatial and temporal extension, the component
will change its motion only if it is struck, pushed, or pulled by another
component. In both supertask and space invader cases, the indeterminism
arises only when we assemble these many individually well-behaved parts
into the pathological totality.
The dome is unlike this. There is only one component, the mass, and
no new interaction brings about its spontaneous motion.Theonlyrelevant
force, the external gravitational ﬁeld, acts on the mass in exactly the same
way at the moment of spontaneous excitation as it had in all the moments
prior. No story in terms of smaller, individually well-behaved parts is
possible for why the mass changed its state of motion at just the moment
of excitation and not at any other. The best we can say is that it did
because it could and it could because Newton’s laws allow it.
2.3. Losing Touch. As David Malament (2008) has shown, if the mass
has any nonzero initial velocity at , it ﬂies off the dome’s surface. r p 0
This does not compromise the dome as an example of indeterminism in
Newtonian theory; indeterminism remains in the case of zero initial
velocity.
To see that losing touch arises, consider a radial motion , that h(t) r(t)
lies on the dome’s surface, with h and r both strictly increasing with t.I t
starts at , with a nonzero initial velocity . r p 0 t p 0 v(0) p dr(0)/dt 1 0
The vertical velocity is , where we use the fact that h dh/dt p dh/dr 7 dr/dt
can also be expressed as a function of r, since r is strictly increasing with
t. It now follows that the vertical acceleration is
22 22 22 2 dh /dt p dh/dr 7 dr /dt  dh /dr 7 (dr/dt) . (6)
Recalling (1), , we have , so that
3/2 1/2 h p (2/3g)rd h /dr p (1/g) 7 r
2 2 1/2 dh /dr p 1/(2gr ).
Thus is inﬁnite at the apex . So, from the second term
22 dh /dr h p r p 0
of (6), the vertical acceleration at must also be inﬁnite, as
22 dh /dt t p 0
long as the initial velocity . If the mass is to remain on v(0) p dr(0)/dt 1 0
the surface, it must have an inﬁnitely large vertical acceleration
3 at its
ﬁrst instant at . That is impossible since the greatest acceleration t p 0
3. In the case of the spontaneous motion (4), the expression (6) becomes indeterminate
at since its second term becomes . Other arguments show that the vertical t p 0 0/0
acceleration at is zero. Combining (1) with (4), we ﬁnd that h varies with
22 dh /dt t p T
in the interval , so that varies with , which vanishes at
62 2 4 (tT) t ≥ Td h /dt (tT)
. t p T790 JOHN D. NORTON
gravity can provide is g, and at the apex it is . So the mass gsin0 p 0
cannot remain on the surface.
We could modify the example slightly. We could replicate the essential
properties of the dome with a rather extravagantly idealized bead on a
wire. The wire of no thickness is formed into the proﬁle of the dome and
threads an inﬁnitely small bead of unit mass that slides frictionlessly along
it. The diverging of at shows that the wire must exert an
22 dh /dt t p 0
inﬁnite reaction force on the bead just at the moment if the bead t p 0
is to slide along the wire from the apex with an initial velocity greater
than zero. We should not dismiss momentarily inﬁnite reaction forces.
They arise in common examples in Newtonian mechanics. Consider a ball
that bounces off a hard surface in which we idealize the bounce to be
momentary. A momentary, inﬁnite reaction force is needed to reverse the
direction of the ball instantly.
All these difﬁculties disappear if we posit ab initio the existence of an
outward, radially directed force ﬁeld in some space that exerts a force on
a unit mass of magnitude in the radial coordinate r.I tt h e nf o l l o w s
1/2 r
automatically that the equation of motion of the unit mass is (2) and the
indeterminism ensues. If the idea of a force ﬁeld everywhere directed away
from an empty point in space is bothersome, a slight modiﬁcation can
put sources at the centers of force. Imagine a source mass point that exerts
a short-range, attractive force of magnitude
1/2 (L  s)f o r s ≤ L
f(s) p {0f o r s 1 L
on a unit mass at distance s from the source. If we locate the unit mass
at position on some straight line and the attracting mass at r p 0 r p
, then the unit mass is attracted by a force of magnitude in the
1/2 Lr
interval . Or, in Coulomb electrostatics, imagine a sphere of 0 ≤ r ! L
positive charge in three-dimensional space whose density is proportional
to for r a radial coordinate. It turns out that the force acting on a
1/2 1/r
unit test charge is outwardly directed from the singular point in the dis-
tribution at and is proportional to .
1/2 r p 0 r
Finally, if we just consider motions governed by the equation of motion
(2), then it can be shown that, for the case of nonzero initial velocity
, there is a unique solution of the equations of motion v(0) p dr(0)/dt 1 0
(2). See the Appendix.
3. What’s Wrong with the Dome? Many believe that the dome somehow
lies outside what is proper in Newtonian theory. Three distinct bases for
this judgment are described below, along with my reasons for ﬁnding them
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3.1. Does the Dome Employ an Incomplete Formulation of Newtonian
Physics? The proposal is that Newton’s three laws are an incomplete
formulation of Newtonian theory. The intent of Newtonian theorists was
that their theory would be deterministic and all the traditional Newtonian
systems are deterministic. Therefore, any formulation of Newtonian the-
ory that admits indeterministic motions is incomplete and must be
strengthened to preclude them.
My ﬁrst and ﬁnal reaction to this proposal is that we must distinguish
what the canonical formulation of Newtonian theory entails from what
its proponents may mistakenly think their theory entails. The dome con-
forms to Newton’s laws, so the dome is a Newtonian system. The old
lore was mistaken in holding that simple systems like the mass on the
dome will be deterministic in Newtonian theory.
There are two complications. First, strengthening Newton’s theory is
not straightforward. We need to ﬁnd some additional postulate to sup-
plement the three laws, a “fourth law.” But what can it be? Merely as-
serting as the fourth law that determinism holds is inadequate. The three
laws allow competing, indeterministic motions. That form of the fourth
law is not telling us which of the competing motions, if any, are to be
admitted into the theory. As we strengthen the fourth law to pick among
them, we risk restricting the theory excessively and precluding systems
that are unobjectionable; or we may have such a narrow formulation of
the fourth law that it is tailored to resolving indeterminism only in special
cases. While the proposals are preliminary,
4 I have seen none yet that can
resolve these problems.
5
Second, it is hard to determine what Newtonian theory properly is. So
it is hard to know if a proposed fourth law properly belongs in it. What
Newtonian theory is cannot be established by an experiment since New-
tonian theory is a false theory; and it cannot be determined by mathe-
matical demonstration since Newtonian theory is not deﬁned as a theorem
4. Korolev (2006) suggests that a tacit presumption of Newtonian physics is that the
differential equations of motion derived from it satisfy a Lipschitz condition. A Lip-
schitz condition is a sufﬁcient condition mathematically for differential equations to
have a unique solution. Since it is only sufﬁcient, it may be too strong. Tymoczko
(n.d.) has proposed that the informal import of Newton’s ﬁrst law is not fully expressed
by the condition of vanishing acceleration at an instant if the net force vanishes at
that instant. Rather the law asserts in addition that this inertial motion continues over
a nonvanishing time interval provided that inertial motion does not in turn trigger
further forces. That leaves open the question of whether determinism is preserved if
the continuing motion does trigger further forces.
5. Alper et al. (2000) in effect assert that energy and momentum conservation has been
a tacit fourth law of Newtonian physics that would preclude indeterministic supertask
systems from counting as properly Newtonian.792 JOHN D. NORTON
of some grander system. Perhaps the best we can say is weak: Newtonian
theory is delineated historically by the community of physicists. They
have the right to add a fourth law to Newtonian theory, creating an older
three-law and a newer four-law version. We should object, however, to
the decree that the original three-law version is no version at all, for
through most of its history, the community of Newtonians took the three
laws by themselves to deﬁne the theory.
3.2. Is the Dome “Unphysical”? Another common reaction to the in-
determinism of the dome is that it is “unphysical” and hence can be
dismissed. This reaction may have many groundings. Perhaps most im-
portant is a sense that Newtonian theory is true, well enough, of our
ordinary world and that the ordinary world just does not admit masses
that spontaneously set themselves into motion.
In short, my response is that a careful examination of just what “un-
physical” may mean fails to license the idea that the dome is unphysical
in a way that would allow us to excise it from Newtonian physics. The
principal difﬁculty is that the dome is intended to explore the properties
of Newtonian theory, not the actual world. As a false theory, Newtonian
theory can certainly have consequences that do not agree with ordinary
expectations, especially if the background conditions are artfully con-
trived.
The sense of what is “unphysical” or “physical” is quite fundamental
to the intuitions of physicists. At the same time, it is a primitive notion
that has not attracted further explication. I have been able to distinguish
four senses, two of which are relevant to the dome:
a) Unphysical as gauge (overdescription). For descriptive convenience,
a theory may admit more structures than are in the world, such as
the origin of a coordinate system in a Euclidean space. It is plainly
unphysical to think of this origin as the preferred center of the space.
I do not think this is the sense of unphysical at issue with the dome,
since the motions described do not arise from arbitrary choices made
as descriptive conveniences.
b) Unphysical as false. In this usage, a theory makes a prediction that
is false and quite far from approximations to the actual. A classical
electrodynamical analysis of heat radiation predicts the “ultraviolet
catastrophe,” that heat radiation at equilibrium has an inﬁnite en-
ergy density. This prediction in unphysical in that it directly con-
tradicts the ﬁnite energy densities found in experiments. The remedy
is to renounce the offending theory as a false theory, or at least false
in the domain in which the failed prediction was made.
If this is the sense of unphysical that is at issue with the dome, then itTHE DOME 793
gives us no license to absolve the Newtonian theory of indeterminism. At
best it would tell us that Newtonian theory is just a false theory. It is no
basis for concluding that the theory does not entail the prediction.
However, we do not even have a falsiﬁed prediction. The dome is not
intended to represent a real physical system. The dome is purely an ide-
alization within Newtonian theory. On our best understanding of the
world, there can be no such system. For an essential part of the setup is
to locate the mass exactly at the apex of the dome and exactly at rest.
Quantum mechanics assures us that cannot be done. What the dome
illustrates is indeterminism within Newtonian theory in an idealized sys-
tem that we do not expect to be realized in the world.
c) Unphysical as pathological. In this third case, a physical theory is
used to generate conclusions that actually turn out to contradict the
original theory. Of course a consistent theory cannot entail conclu-
sions that contradict it. However, such conclusions can be deduced
if we add logically incompatible assumptions to a consistent theory.
The “ultraviolet catastrophe” mentioned above is an example. In
electrodynamical theory, we assume that there are ﬁnite E and B
ﬁelds at every point in space. We add the supposition that the ra-
diation ﬁeld has come to thermal equilibrium as described in sta-
tistical physics. We infer that, were such a state possible, it would
have an inﬁnite energy density. But that would happen only if the
E and B ﬁelds diverge, contrary to the assumption of the theory.
A second illustration arises in general relativity from the incautious
treatment of singularities as events in a manifold with metrical structure,
whereupon they become unphysical. For at curvature singularities, the
metrical structure becomes singular, in contradiction to the regular be-
havior presumed by the theory.
This sense is not relevant to the dome since its indeterminism does not
contradict Newtonian laws.
d) Unphysical through underdescription. A theory may underdescribe or
underconstrain a system’s properties, so that the theory admits so-
lutions that do not apply to the system. It is standard practice to
dismiss these superﬂuous solutions as “unphysical.” For example,
consider a ball that bounces in a perfectly elastic collision with a
hard ﬂoor. If its speed just before the bounce is u and v just after,
the conservation of kinetic energy requires . Taking square
22 u p v
roots, we have that or . We discard the ﬁrst of the u p vu p v
two solutions as “unphysical” since it corresponds to the ball pen-
etrating the ﬂoor without impediment.
Other, weightier examples arise in time-symmetricelectrodynamical the-794 JOHN D. NORTON
ories. They admit the time-reversed solutions in which waves collapse
onto charges, energizing them. These solutions are dismissed as “un-
physical” since a tacit assumption is that we are concerned only with
outwardly directed radiation.
This discarding of superﬂuous solutions as unphysical seems to be clos-
est to what is intended in the declaration that the dome is unphysical.
For its import is that the dome can somehow be excised from Newtonian
theory, without discarding the full theory. However, this fourth category
cannot be applied to the dome since it requires that there is a target system
we seek to describe of which we have independent knowledge. That in-
dependent knowledge is used to determine that some solutions are su-
perﬂuous and may be discarded. In the case of the bouncing ball, those
further conditions come from our knowledge that the ﬂoor is impenetra-
ble, an aspect of the target system not captured in the equality .
22 u p v
To get physically meaningful solutions, we must implement that impen-
etrability by requiring that u and v have opposite signs.
In the case of the dome, there is no target system of which we can have
independent knowledge. As we have seen, the dome cannot exist in the
world. It is a creation that resides entirely within Newtonian theory. So
we have no means of judging that some solutions delivered by the theory
are superﬂuous and should be discarded.
3.3. Does the Dome Use Inadmissible Idealizations? The concern is that
the idealizations required by the dome may be so extreme as to be in-
admissible, so that the dome displays no inherent indeterminism in New-
tonian theory, but only the pathology of an inadmissible idealization.
There are many idealizations that we could identify as suspect. The mass
is a point, so it has zero extension in space and inﬁnite density. It slides
frictionlessly over a perfectly even surface. The curvature of the surface
diverges at the apex.
6 The mass must be placed at perfect rest exactly at
the apex. The surface is assumed perfectly rigid so that it does not deform
under the weight of the mass.
7
In short, my response will be that, while some idealizations may be
inadmissible in certain circumstances, those used in the dome are admis-
sible. Each of them can be found in one form or another in standard
texts in Newtonian theory. For example, while the surface admits a cur-
vature singularity at its apex, the tangent to the surface is everywhere
deﬁned. Hence it is more differentiable than another surface routinely
6. Malament (2008) ﬁnds this idealization no more troublesome than others routinely
employed in Newtonian theory.
7. Korolev (2006) notes that allowing any elastic deformation of the surface would
destroy the shape needed at the apex for indeterminism to obtain.THE DOME 795
appearing in Newtonian texts, a tabletop with a sharp edge formed by
the intersection of two ﬂat surfaces. At the edge, both curvature and
tangent are undeﬁned.
The complaints leveled against the idealizations of the dome seem to
arise through a process of reasoning backward. The real goal is to disallow
indeterminism. So when the dome manifests indeterminism, the strategy
is to see if dismissal of its idealizations will defeat the indeterminism. That
is simply an oblique way of imposing determinism as an extra law of
Newtonian physics.
We can distinguish two types of failure of idealization, external and
internal. I will argue that neither failure arises in the case of the dome.
The external failures arise when a theory tries to describe a system that
is speciﬁed independently from the theory and the idealization strays too
far from the target system. That form of failure is not relevant to the
dome since there is no externally speciﬁed target system.
Internal failures arise when there is difﬁculty intrinsic to therelationship
of the idealization to the theory. The strongest way this can arise is if we
idealize to the extent that we contradict the theory. For example, in a
theory that prohibits propagations faster than light, we cannot idealize
bodies as perfectly rigid, insofar as perfect rigidity allows inﬁnitely fast
propagations through the bodies. This form of failure is not present in
the dome.
A weaker internal failure may arise when idealizations are recovered
as the limit of more realistic structures. A point mass is the limit of
successively smaller, perfectly spherical masses of correspondingly greater
density. We may be tempted to say that if some property changes dis-
continuously when the limit is taken, we have an inadmissible idealization.
A sharp table edge is the limit of a smoothly beveled table edge with
successively smaller bevels. A mass sliding off the horizontal table will be
projected in a parabolic arc. As we consider successively smaller bevels,
so that the limit of a sharp edge is approached, the parabolic arcs of the
mass projected will approach that of the mass projected over the sharp
edge. In the sequence of systems of successively smaller bevels, the prop-
erty of the limit system agrees with thelimitofthe propertiesofthesystems
with successively smaller bevels. That commutation assures us that the
idealization is benign.
Now consider domes with ﬁnite curvatures at their apexes. A point
mass will remain on their apexes indeﬁnitely, according to Newtonian
theory. Thus, as the curvature become arbitrarily large, determinism will
prevail. Yet when we arrive at the limit of inﬁnite curvature, only then
does indeterminism enter. The property of the limit system does not agree
with the limit of the properties of the sequence of systems leading up to796 JOHN D. NORTON
the limit system. Does this mean that the idealization of inﬁnite curvature
is inadmissible?
It does not. The failure is merely of one idealization to approximate
another. That there can be discontinuous changes in the properties of
systems when limits are taken is a commonplace and no reason for dis-
counting the system approached in the limit. To give one illustration, it
has long been recognized in statics that the stresses in a loaded horizontal
beam supported at either end are determinate, as long as we model the
beam as having some ﬁnite elasticity, no matter how small. In the limiting
case, however, when the beam becomes perfectly rigid, the forces are
indeterminate. We do not infer from this that the rigid case is no New-
tonian structure at all. We merely allow that it is a different case with
qualitatively different properties that cannot always be recovered by tak-
ing limits in elastic systems.
Elsewhere (Norton 2004, Section 2.2.3) I have described an idealized
helicopter rotor. As its speed is halved and its size doubled, the nonzero
lift L it generates remains the same. In the limit of inﬁnitely many dou-
blings, we have an inﬁnite rotor at rest that still generates lift L;o rw e
would, if we mistakenly insist that its properties must agree with those
arising in the limiting process.
4. Conclusion. The suggestion that the dome is “unphysical” is especially
noteworthy. This notion has attracted much less attention among phi-
losophers of science than is commensurate with its importance for phys-
icists. For them, the notion of “physical” functions as a powerful guide
and ﬁlter, with an authority that is almost as oracle-like as it is unanalyzed.
In Section 3.2, I gave deﬂationary analysis, portraying the notion as the
coalescence of four related ideas, each of which is unremarkable when
examined in isolation. It will be interesting to see if further analysis bears
out this deﬂationary view or if there is something of greater epistemic
moment at hand.
8
Appendix: Unique Solution of the Equation of Motion
for Initial Conditions ,
2 2 1/2 dr (t)/dt p r(t) r(0) p 0 v(0) p dr(0)/dt 1 0
Equation (2),
2 2 1/2 dr /dt p r ,
8. For recent discussion of further difﬁculties in establishing indeterminism in classical
physics, see Wilson 2007; and for discussion of dome-like and other indeterminism in
physics, see Kosyakov 2007.THE DOME 797
has a unique solution for the boundary condition and r(0) p 0
. This is established by showing that any solution dr(0)/dt p v(0) 1 0 r(t)
of (2) with these boundary conditions must satisfy the integral condition
(A4) and that (A4) admits a unique solution.
If the solution satisﬁes and is continuous and twice differen- v(0) 1 0
tiable, then must remain positive for some time interval following the v(t)
instant . Hence is strictly increasing in t in this interval, so that t p 0 r(t)
v is a function of r. The demonstration of existence and uniqueness will
be limited to this interval. (That is sufﬁcient, since once the system has
left , it enters regions in which a Lipschitz condition is satisﬁed.) r p 0
This solution must satisfy (2) rewritten as r(t)
1/2 2 2 r p dr /dt p dv/dt p dv/dr 7 dr/dt
2 p v 7 dv/dr p (1/2) 7 (dv /dt), (A1)
where we have used the fact that v is a function of r. Its ﬁrst integral is
22 3 / 2 v (r)  v (0) p (4/3)r , (A2)
which is equivalent to
2 3/2 1/2 v p dr/dt p (v (0)  (4/3)r ) . (A3)
Equation (A3) can be integrated to yield
tr   dr   t p dt p .( A 4 )    23 / 2 v (0)  (4/3)r 00
Any solution must satisfy (A4) and is unique for each . Since the r(t) v(0)
integrand of (A4) is always positive, it follows that t is a unique, strictly
increasing function of r. Hence the function is invertible to the unique t(r)
function , in which r is a strictly increasing function of t. Therefore, r(t)
also and in the interval of the solution. dt/dr 1 0 v(t) p dr/dt 1 0
By reversing the calculations of (A1)–(A4), we can afﬁrm that this
unique does solve (2). Finally, the solution cannot be more than twice r(t)
differentiable at . Differentiating (2), we have t p 0
3 3 1/2 dr (t)/dt p (1/2r(t)) 7 dr/dt.
At , and , so this third derivative diverges. t p 0 dr/dt 1 0 r p 0
Finally, even though (2) has a unique solution with , , it r p 0 v(0) 1 0
does not satisfy a Lipschitz condition with this boundary condition. (A
Lipschitz condition is sufﬁcient but not necessary for existence of a unique
solution.) To see this, rewrite (2) as
1/2 dr(t)/dt p v(t), dv(t)/dt p r(t).
A Lipschitz condition is satisﬁed in a region surrounding the points798 JOHN D. NORTON
, if there exists a K such that for every pair of values in r p 0 v p v(0)
the region and , (t, r, v )( t, r , v ) 11 22
2 1/2 1/2 2 2 2 2 (v  v )  (r  r ) ≤ K [(v  v )  (r  r )] . 12 1 2 12 12
This can be rewritten as
1 22 22 2 (K  1)(v  v )  K  (r  r ) ≥ 0. 12 1 2 2 []  ( r  r ) 12
No value of K can make this inequality hold since, for each K, its ﬁrst
term can be made to vanish by choosing and its second term can v p v 12
be made negative by choosing values of and close enough to zero. rr 12
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